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Abstract
Smart grid(SG), which is considered as next generation power grid is an two
way connected power system framework which enables easy monitoring and main-
tenance of power systems when compared to the existing power systems. Smart
grid is also called as electrical grid or intelligent grid is an enhancement of 20th
century power grid. Smart grid technically depends upon the network protocol and
the topology over which it is constructed. Hence like the conventional connected
systems, smart grid is also prone to number of security threats like Eavesdrop-
ping attack, data alteration attack, identity spoofing attack, compromised key
attack, replay attack and distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack. In-spite
of providing good technology to all the connected systems, there are frequent se-
curity breaches like DDOS attack which will extremely influence the availability
of smart grid framework. Attacks targeting the availability like DDOS attack are
the interruption of access or use of information which may further disrupt the
power delivery. This thesis discusses detection and isolation of DDOS attack on
Smart Grid. We have proposed three techniques to protect the framework against
DDOS attack utilizing Marking system, TTL Value investigation and MAC value
examination. The analysis of marking scheme has been carried out on Network
Simulator Version 2. The identification of fake packets has been carried out using
TTL value with help of Cisco packet tracer, cola soft packet builder and Snort
Intrusion detection tool. The uniqueness of the MAC address and IP address are
matched with the help of Arpwatch tool and Snort Intrusion detection tool to
detect the fake MAC and IP address pair. With these schemes it is possible to
pro-actively prevent the DDOS attack.
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Introduction
1.1 Smart grid systems
Smart grid is a new method of interconnected system for conveying power from
producers to consumers in efficient, flexible and in more robust manner with high
power-flow control, self-healing and with high data security using the digital tech-
nology [1]. According to the IEEE standard, Smart Grid is a mixture of power,
communications and information technology for well advanced electric power sys-
tem serving the power load. The word “Smart” in Smart Grid is included due
to the added benefit of communication and intelligence to the existing power grid
which eases the monitoring and maintenance of system. The merit of converting
the conventional Power Grid systems to Smart Grid is; more efficient transfer of
electricity, quicker restoration of power outages, reduced maintenance and oper-
ation cost, increased integration of large scale power source and security control.
Smart Grid systems can make an automatic diversion of the power based on the
needs and in the case of outages. It also helps to make energy efficient process
by creating awareness among customers about the power usage. Significant re-
search has to be done towards stabilizing Smart Grid for the purpose of changing
the power grid into an efficient and intelligent electric power distribution system
adaptable to the present environment.
The benefits of having a Smart Grid rather than having a general Power Grid
Systems make a wide difference to both the users and for the organizers of power
systems by providing intelligence to the system and reliability to the customers.
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Some other the benefits of having Smart Grid systems are pointed out here [2]:
 Providing new services to the customers at the ease of a click
 Improving the resilience of the system against the outage
 Strengthening the system against security attacks
 Automation of routine maintenance work
 Efficient routing of power
 Enhancing the efficiency of existing system
 Access to historical data [3]
 Reduction of energy loss.
In Figure 1.1 given below gives a brief overview about the components of typ-
ical Smart Grid systems. According to IEEE smart grid, the entire smart grid
system is divided into seven components namely: Bulk generator, Transmission,
Distribution, Customer, Service Provider, Operations and Markets. Bulk genera-
tion indicates the procedure of handling and gathering power from renewable and
non renewable energy source in huge quantity. Distribution domain delivers the
electricity to and from the customers in smart grid. The distribution network
connects the savvy meters and all intelligent field devices for managing and con-
trolling them by means of two-way channel. The operations entity of the smart
grid model manages and controls the electricity flow of all other domains inside the
smart grid system. It uses two way communication channel between customers and
substations. The Market domain, works and organizes all the members inside the
shrewd lattice to give administrations like business administration, wholesaling,
retailing and exchanging of vitality administrations. The Service Provider do-
main handles all outsider-operations among these domains. This incorporate web
entrances that give vitality productivity administrations to clients, information
exchange between the client and the utilities in regards to vitality administration
and power supplied to homes and structures.
3
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual smart grid model
Few issues exists in the Smart Grid Systems even though it has plenty of ben-
efits over the traditional Power grid systems. Cyber security is an important area
in the Smart Grid that has to be taken care. The incident of security breaches
which raised the concern of users connected over the internet in past few years
include Distributed Denial of Service Attack whose main goal is to bring the avail-
ability of resource to legitimate users by overloading it with traffic from multiple
sources. They target a wide variety of resources, from banks to news websites
and present a major threat to make sure people can publish and access important
information over the grid. In Distributed Denial of Service attack, the attacker
either takes control of multiple or single vulnerable system to create a spoofed
IP address attack. The attackers in DDOS attack usually changes the source IP
address to hide their identity which is called as spoofed IP address attack.
1.2 Literature review
Smart Grid systems have the goal to enhance performance of the existing power
system by providing high availability, enhanced security, authenticated access con-
trol, easy maintenance and reduced cost[3] . To ensure the availability of critical
real time power system, we must defend the system against all kind of security
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attacks. Security threats over the Smart Grid systems are applicable to all the
industrial systems[5]. Some of such threats are
 Denial of Service attacks [4],
 Eavesdropping [5],
 Man-in-the-middle attack [6],
 Identify Spoofing [6],
 Intrusion attack [6],
 Compromised key attack [4]
The Cyber security working group in the NIST Smart Grid panel has issued various
guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber security to improve the performance over the
above security issues [7]. Further three level security objectives are classified for
Smart Grid based upon Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality.
 Attacks targeting Availability - The most important objective of Smart Grid
system is to ensure reliable and timely access to the end user information.
Attacks like DOS and DDOS can disrupt the availability of system for critical
real time application.
 Attacks targeting integrity - Protecting against incorrect modification or
removal of user data are more essential for the marketing purpose. Loss of
integrity in smart grid systems leads to incorrect decision regarding the user
billing data.
 Attacks targeting confidentiality - Preventing unauthorized access to data
for preserving privacy is also a major objective of Smart Grid system. This
is particularly necessary when private data should not be disclosed publicly.
Here we concentrate on the attack targeting availability. i.e, Distributed Denial of
Service attack. The act of making a system or network resource unavailable to its
destined users is termed as Denial of Service attack whereas in Distributed Denial
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of Service attack, multiple compromised systems were used to target single ma-
chine causing denial of service attack. In DDOS attack, the approaching activity
overflowed from various source pointing at single exploited person is for the most
part gigantic to control it by blocking single IP location and it is exceptionally
troublesome to discover contrast between ordinary and assault movement when it
is spread crosswise over numerous sources.
DDOS is one of the prime threats in the current Internet world because of its
ability to create a enormous volume of unwanted traffic. The primary purpose of
this attacks is to prevent access to a particular resource like a Web site [8]. The
first reported Large-volume DDOS attack occurred in August, 1999, against the
University of Minnesota [8]. This attack ceases down the victim’s network for more
than two days. In the year 2000, DDOS attack stopped many major commercial
Web sites, including Yahoo and CNN, from performing their normal operations [8].
D. Moore et al. [8] used backscatter analysis on three weeks datasets to evaluate
the number, duration and focus of DDOS attacks to characterize their behaviour.
They found that more than 12,000 attacks had occurred. Recently during the year
2013, massive 300Gbps attack was thrown against Spamhaus’ website. Thus the
severity of DDOS attack is increasing over every year. Hence in order to devise
a broad solution for DDoS, there is a need to study and analyse the impact of
DDoS attack against connected systems like Smart Grid. Here we have compared
five different research papers which have used TTL value analysis and marking
scheme as given in the below Table 1.1
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Table 1.1: Related work
Authors MAC value analysis TTL value analysis Marking scheme
Yao chen [9] 7 7 3
Ryo [10] 7 3 7
Cheng Jin [11] 7 3 7
Qiang [12] 7 7 3
Yaar [13] 7 7 3
1.3 Motivation
Smart Grid Systems are the combination of diverse legacy frameworks with new
technologies and architectural changes. To help this, security for smart grid has
to be strengthened towards the attack targeting the availability, integrity and con-
fidentiality of usual connected systems. Attacks targeting the loss of availability
is the interruption of access or use of information which may further disrupt the
power delivery. Henceforth we are persuaded to work on the attacks focusing on
the availability.
1.4 Problem statement
In our proposed work we pro-actively scan every incoming packets and mitigate
the DDOS attack using the Time To Live (TTL) value [10] and Media access
control address (MAC) value analysis. Further we associate multiple routers to
produce an Marking on each incoming packet to the victim using Marking based
Detection And Filtering (MDADF) mechanism [9].
1.5 Research contribution
DDOS attack will extremely influence the availability of Smart Grid framework
and hence we need to safeguard the system against it in the best possible way.
Jelena et al. [14] [15] have used percentage of failed transactions that do not follow
quality of service thresholds as a metric to analyse DDOS impact. They define a
threshold-based model for the relevant traffic measurements, which is application
specific. When the measurement value exceeds its threshold then it indicates poor
services quality. But since transaction time period depends on the volume of data
7
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being transferred and network load, absolute threshold cannot be set as the sole
parameter. Subsequently we proposed three technique to protect the framework
against DDOS attack utilizing Marking system, TTL Value investigation and MAC
value examination.
1.6 Thesis organization
The remaining section of the thesis is organized as follows chapter-2 summarizes
the security objectives and different types of security threats on Smart Grid,
chapter-3 summarizes the Distributed Denial of Service Attack on Smart Grid,
chapter-4 provides details on how DDOS attack is detected and isolated , chapter-
5 provides the Conclusion and Future work.
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Security issues in smart grid
The customary Power Grid segment has coordinated electrical power framework
with communication system to structure a two way channel which is known as,
Smart Grid. This coordination has made the correspondence quicker and adapt-
able as well as more obvious to general society system. The advancement over the
Ubiquitous computing and communication technology have initiated the smarter,
dynamic and more interactive smart grid system which raises the amount of per-
sonal information involved and used in smart grid systems. This automatically
raises the growth of low cost communication network, distributed energy resource,
distributed storage devices and digital meters. In-spite of bringing great perfor-
mance merit to the power sector it also has great potential risk in protecting itself
against the Cyber threats.
2.1 Security objectives
The reliability of a Smart Grid System is depended upon the control and com-
munication systems over which it was developed. Smart Grid needs high powered
network connectivity to support new features and better network performance is
based upon its protocols which is open to the global community. The security
objective of smart grid is quite different from the other connected systems. It is
important to take care that, any security countermeasure implemented on Smart
Grid system does not affect its basic performance. Here we discuss various se-
curity objectives of smart grid systems like privacy, availability, authentication,
non-reputability, integrity, authorization and third party protection.
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2.1.1 Privacy
The measure of personal data included and utilized within Smart Grid system
has drastically expanded with the advancement of savvy network. Savvy meters
and other gadgets used in smart grid may give access to the intimate details
of the customers. Protection issues of Smart Grid framework bargain with the
way obliged data is going to be gathered, utilized and revealed. Further it is
also important to know how Smart Grid would gather information about the
individuals like the energy fluctuation of individual customer is so unique that it
may be possible to identify the power system based upon the usage data. Smart
meters and roaming smart grid devices may expose the data about consumers
activity which leads to private information such as how many people live in the
home, their schedule of using the home appliance and even sleeping patterns could
be revealed easily.
2.1.2 Availability
Internet has made a large portion of the exercises on-line and this should continue
expanding through the years. Consequently any attack focusing on its accessibil-
ity will simply disintegrate the human movement. Smart Grid frameworks must
guarantee that unapproved individual or framework can get access or use to au-
thorized components. Availability of smart grid must be considered with top care
since power system play a vital role in our everyday life activity. Any malicious
activity targeting the availability can be taken as denial of service attack which is
motivated to slab the information over the network.
The services of many application are seriously harmed and thus part of business
lose are caused because of these attacks. In DDOS situation, the attack originates
from distinctive source and thus its all the more destroying. Subsequently there
is a more terrific need to assess the brunt of attacks over Smart Grid.
2.1.3 Integrity
Integrity has to be maintained on every system to ensure that data is not modified
by authorized or unauthorized person in the network. In Smart Grid system this
11
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applies to maintaining the sensor values, product varieties and billing details. A
attack targeting integrity in smart grid system usually corrupt either customer
information or network information like usage, metering data, voltage readings or
device status. The risk of attack focusing on data integrity in the power networks
is very solid which includes false data injection attack by injecting the fake data
into the system for attackers benefit.
2.1.4 Authentication
Authentication involves identifying the right person to enter the smart grid system
and thereby preventing any malicious activity. Main concern of authentication in-
volves identifying legitimate and illegitimate users using authentication standards.
2.1.5 Authorization
Authorization is the act of providing access control to the users who are eligible
to do specific changes over the system. On a broader view, authorization differ-
entiates between legitimate and illegitimate users for any system.
2.1.6 Nonrepudation and Third party protection
Nonrepudation refers to providing assurance that someone cannot deny over some-
thing. Nonrepudation refers to the ability to ensure that everyone cooperate in the
system by the help of third party protection. Digital signature is used to ensure the
data or document is mutually agreed and verified. In smart grid, nonrepudation
is most needed to regulate the users with common agreement.
12
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2.2 Security threats in smart grid
Security threats in Smart Grid systems are classified based upon the selfish users
and malicious users. Selfish clients are those who are trying to get more network
resources than it was allotted to them by tampering standards. Malicious users
are the one who have no motto to get advantage for their benefit but still they
aim to illegally fetch, update or delete information in the network. In smart grid
malicious clients have to be taken care more seriously than selfish users since a
lot of frameworks are utilized for observing and control reason apart from giving
information help. Further selfish users are of less importance since amount of data
transmitted over the network is very less which is usually the billing data.
Due to the modernization of the smart grid, security threats associated with
other similar network are also applicable to the present smart grid system. Here
we elaborate various such issues.
2.2.1 Eavesdropping
In Eavesdropping attack, the information packets are watched and once the at-
tacker has the right to gain entrance to metering gadget of keen network, he is
equipped for sniffing the whole information over the system. Listening in are by
and large utilized for the business reason by checking and using the behavioural
example of clients.
2.2.2 Data alteration
When the attacker has gained control over the grid, he can change the sniffed data
as needed and send back the new version of data to the smart grid systems. Both
the attackers and end users were also interested in modifying the usage for their
own benefit.
2.2.3 Identity spoofing attack
In Smart Grid system each metering interface is assigned an unique IP address
which is used reveal their identity. Once the attacker gains information about
the system by eavesdropping, they can select any IP address from the network by
13
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IP spoofing and can send false information. Identity spoofing is used by DDOS
attack when flooding data packets. Man-in-the-middle, message replays, network
spoofing attack are some of the common identity spoofing attack [6].
2.2.4 Compromised key attack
Compromised key attack are often possible in metering network of smart grid
where the system uses identical key for encryption and decryption of the metering
data. If the key which is being used to encipher the information is compromised
then it is very easy to calculate the decryption key thereby gaining access to me-
tering data which is modified by consumer to send false metering data. Utility
operator gains access to the metering infrastructure to the utility plan of con-
sumers.
2.2.5 Replay attack
Replay attacks can be launched when an attacker gain access to smart meters
and inject control signals to the system. The attacker first needs to record data
transmitted from customer to smart meters and analyse them to achieve customers
characteristics of power usage. After analysing, the attacker may inject the data
to grid system. Two common purpose of this attack is to steal energy and other
is to cause physical damage to the system [16].
2.3 Attacks over the smart grid framework
Smart Grid framework is divided into four components and classified based upon
the common attack possible as: power generator, service provider, Smart Grid
system and customer. Power generator is responsible for generation and distri-
bution of power to the service provider. Service provider does the monitoring
operation over the entire framework for the purpose of billing and routing. Smart
Grid system component does the job of load balancing, encrypting and decrypting
of user billing data between each customer. Further it takes care of authentication
and authorization over the framework. The encrypted data which is received from
different customers are decrypted and sent back to the service provider. Different
14
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types of attack that are commonly found over the above said smart grid systems
framework are Eavesdropping, Denial of Service attack, Data alteration, Identity
Spoofing, Compromised Key attack and Replay attack. Framework depicting the
possible attack over different components of Smart Grid network is shown below
in the Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: Attacks on smart grid framework
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen the basic security objectives and different security
threats over the Smart Grid system. Further, sequence of attack possible over the
Smart Grid Framework is explained to have a brief idea on the real time attack
scenario over the system.
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Distributed denial of service
attack on Smart Grid
Primary goal of Smart Grid System is availability. Denial of Service attack can
severely impact the availability of smart grid system by degrading the communi-
cation performance. As the global network increases in size, the attack volume
also increases giving birth to the raise of Distributed Denial of Service Attack.
Internet was assembled without much stress about the security and thus perni-
cious clients misuse each part of it. The incident which has triggered the interest
of many engineers in past few decades is the DDOS attack whose whole purpose is
to cut down the availability of services provided over the network to its authentic
clients. This is carried out by discovering vulnerabilities in applications, protocols
or by depleting the network and computational asset or memory of victimized
person. In Distributed Denial of Service, the attacker first takes control of huge
number of systems which are traditionally called zombies and then utilize them
to send large volume of packets in parallel which are valid most of the time. The
attackers in DDOS attack usually modify their identities to hide their presence
and make it difficult to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate traffic
packets. This idea of changing the identity with the help of IP address is called
as IP Address spoofing.
17
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3.1 Classification
Attacks based on communication
Based upon the communication between attacker and the victim, we can define
two type of DDOS attack:
 Attack with Direct Communication
 Attack with In-Direct Communication
In Attack with Direct Communication, both attacker and victim need to have
gained knowledge of each other identity to communicate. Main drawback of this
approach is that compromising one machine can lead to the finding whole network
responsible behind the attack.
In Attack with In-Direct Communication, the identity of attacker is not known
to victim. The attacker initiates the attack with the help of multiple zombies
present between victim and attacker. Most of the time, the attack created by
zombies are not known to themselves.
Classification by degree of automation
During the attack , the attacker has to find the suitable zombies and contaminate
them to create DDOS strike. Based on the level of mechanizing the attack has
carried, Jameel Hashmi.et.al [17] classified the DDOS attack into three types:
 Manual Attack
 Semi Automatic Attack
 Automatic attack
In Manual Attack, the attacker manually scan the remote machine for its vulner-
abilities to broke them and install the strike code. In Semi Automatic Attack,
the attacker utilizes the computerized projects as a part of zombies for checking
and bargaining the victimized person machine. In Automatic attack, the need for
communication between attacker and zombies are avoided. Both semi-automatic
and automatic attacks use compromised systems by sending programmed filtering
and spread methods.
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Classification based on random scanning
During the phase of randomly scanning for the victim, each compromised host
probes the victim machine with different seed. This obviously creates huge volume
of traffic. Attacks are classified based upon the scanning of victim into four types:
 Attacks based on Hit-list Scanning
 Attacks based on Topological Scanning
 Attacks based on Permutation Scanning
 Attacks based on Local Subnet Scanning
 Attacks based on Central Source Propagation
 Attacks based on Back Chaining Propagation
In Hit-ist Scanning, attacker probes for all the address given in the externally
supplied list. When it finds the unstable machine, it sends one half of the initial
hit-list to other recipients and keeps the remaining half.
In Topological Scanning, attacker uses the data on victim to select new victims.
Email based attacks are based upon the topological scanning.
In Permutation Scanning,all the traded off machines impart a typical IP lo-
cation space where every IP location is mapped to a list in this schedule. The
machine starts checking by utilizing the file registered from its IP address as an
introductory point. At whatever point it sees an effectively traded off machine, it
chooses another arbitrary starting.
In local subnet scanning, attacker scans for the targets that are available within
the subnet of available victim.
In Central Source Propagation, the attacker after compromising the agent ma-
chine downloads the attack script from the central source and operate on it.
In Back-Chaining Propagation, attack code was downloaded from the system
that was already compromised and use it to exploit other system. Back chaining
propagation avoids single point of failure.
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DDOS defence mechanism is classified into three categories [9] as given below
 Preventive Defence Mechanism
 Source Tracking Mechanism
 Reactive Solutions Mechanism
3.2.1 Preventive defence mechanism
Preventive Defence Mechanism points at enhancing the resistance level of frame-
work via completing preventive measures even before the victimized person was
affected. Proactive server roaming scheme [18] follows preventive defence mecha-
nism where the system has several number of distributed servers and the area of
server changes among them using secure roaming algorithm. Only the legitimate
users will know the servers roaming time and address of new available server. All
accessible connections are dropped when the server begins wandering, so that just
the substantial clients can get benefits at the outset of each one meandering session
before the attacker finds the dynamic server once more.
3.2.2 Source tracking
Source tracking method tries to trace down the source of attacks so that the
attacker can be eliminated from the network. The existing solution falls under
four groups [9]:
 Packet Marking
 Message Trace-back
 Logging
 Traffic observation
In Packet marking Scheme, path information of packets are encoded inside
each packets as they are travelling through web. This idea is first implemented
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by Savage et al. [23] called as probabilistic packet marking (PPM) plot in which
switches include way data into the distinguishing proof field of IP header in ev-
ery packet with certain likelihood so the end client can remake the attack path
utilizing the markings and accordingly follow out the wellspring of attack. Path
Identifier mechanism proposed by Abraham Yaar et al. [19] follows marking scheme
in which way unique mark is inserted in every packet, in this way empowering the
victimized person to recognize packets crossing the same way through web paying
little respect to IP location ridiculing. This permits the exploited person to take
proactive measure against DDOS attack.
In Message traceback scheme, routers produces ICMP traceback messages for
a percentage of the approaching information and send it with them. We can find
the creativity of packets by preparing their TTL refinement. A few elements to
be acknowledged for assessing the worth of ICMP messages are the separation of
terminus from the switch, how rapidly the packets are accepted after the begin of
attack and whether the ends of the line wishes to get it or not.
In Logging scheme, data about packets are logged at routers. The route to the
attacker could be perceived by the router exchanging data with each other.
In Traffic-observation Scheme, attack way is dictated by watching the rate of
progress of movement on victimized person. Throughout attack stage, assaulter
send tremendous number of packets to the victimized person. Via completing the
connection test constantly, the attacker might be discovered.
3.2.3 Reactive solutions
In reactive measures for DDOS protection,advancing attack is gotten and structure
reacts to it by controlling the stream of strike packets to diminish the impacts of
attack. Path Identifier scheme proposed by Yaar et al. [9] utilizes the thought
of packet stamping by filtering the attack packets as opposed to attempting to
discover the wellspring of attack packets.
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In this chapter we have briefed about Distributed Denial of Service attack and
its classification. Further, defence mechanism to handle DDOS attack was also
analysed.
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Chapter 4
Prevention and Isolation
Methodology
4.1 General flow structure
We use three methods to detect and isolate DDOS attack. The three methods
are Marking Scheme, TTL Value analysis and MAC value analysis. If the packets
which are found positive in any of the methods then it has to be reject to enter
the victim system. Here MAC value analysis works only when the attack pack-
ets are originated within the network. Similarly TTL value analysis works only
when the packets are originated outside the network since packets which are orig-
inated within the network has no change in TTL Value. Marking Scheme works
out only when the routers coordinate with each other to eliminate the DDOS at-
tack. Flowchart given in the below Figure 4.1 describes the overall process of our
algorithm.
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Figure 4.1: General flow structure
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Distributed Denial of Service attack is crumbling the internet every day. Tradi-
tional approach to protect the system against DDOS attack is to provide Source
IP address of the attacker and path it travelled. With this information, the at-
tacker can reach out the Internet Service Provider to drop all packets coming
from the specific attacker. But it is very difficult to detect and stop the DDoS
attacks, particularly those attack which uses IP address spoofing to disguise those
attack flow. Though the source IP address is changed by the attackers, the path
it has taken to reach the victim is totally determined by the network topology
and routers present inside it. Unlike the other methods, Marking scheme can very
well distinguish attack data from the normal data flow by the legitimate users.
In marking scheme, each packet is embedded by certain marking, enabling the
victim to identify the packets which are not from legitimate users by checking
each packet regardless of IP address spoofing. Each packet travelling in the same
path carries the same marking identification and hence the victim can pro-actively
defend themselves against DDOS attack.
4.2.1 Simulation setup
The cost and effort of building a real time distributed network involving thousands
of systems is very high and hence there is the need for constructing simulation
system raises for the research work.
 We use the popular Network Simulator NS2 for simulating the network where
multiple routers coordinate to produce an marking over each packet.
4.2.2 Simulation methodology
We have divided the work into three phase: Marking method, TTL Value analysis
and MAC value analysis. Network simulator NS2 was used for packet marking
analysis. Flow chart depicting the simulation methodology of marking scheme is
given below in the Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Marking scheme flowchart
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In our proposed marking scheme, we create network topology consiting of ’N’
routers with ’M’ clients each where each client and its router are having duplex
link connection. DropTail queue has setup on every router. In drop tail queue each
packets are treated as same. In drop tail queue, when the queue limit has exceeded
its maximum capacity then newly arriving packets are dropped until the queue
is having enough buffer space to accept incoming packets. UDP and FTP traffic
is generated over the network in Variable Bit Rate(VBR) flow. Mean bandwidth
of FTP/UDP traffic, http to ftp ratio, total number of aborted downloads were
calculated based on the traffic pattern.
4.2.3 Simulation parameter
We have taken the following parameters given in Table 4.1 for the Marking Scheme
using network simulator NS2.
Table 4.1: Network simulation parameter
Simulation Parameter Description
Number of Download Total number of downloads in session
Request Interval Time gap between each download request
Session Interval Time gap between each session
Abort Time Time taken for connection Abort
Active Interval Time gap to check number of active download
Monitor Interval Time gap to monitor buffer occupation
Bottleneck Bandwidth Maximum limit for Queue
Tolerance Time Time interval to check the number of failures
Connection Count Number of FTP and UDP connection
4.2.4 Simulation result
In marking scheme, results are analysed based on two scenarios:
 Data packets are travelled directly between source and destination
 Data packets not travelling directly between source and destination.
When IP spoofed packets are used for DDOS attack, the path which each packet
has taken will differ rather than original path destined for the particular IP ad-
dress. Hence we use the deviation in the performance metrics over the change
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in path to locate the occurrence of DDOS attack in network. Each connection
is made up of 50 sessions with each session having 10000 download with bottle
neck bandwidth of 1.5 Mega bits and request size of 5000 bits. Simulation of
higher data flow is created with 50000 sessions with each session having 10 million
downloads at the bottle neck bandwidth of 1.5Mb. Results derived from above
specification are analysed to prove that data with peak curve is the sign of attack
and hence the algorithm to isolate the attack packets has to be initiated. Aver-
age computation data for 10/50 clients without implementation marking is given
below in the Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. Simulation results for 10 and 50 clients
with normal and attack data flow with marking scheme implemented is shown in
the Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6
Figure 4.3: Average computation Data for 10 clients topology
Figure 4.4: Average computation data for 50 clients topology
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Figure 4.5: Comparison for 10 clients topology with marking
Figure 4.6: Comparison for 50 clients topology with marking
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In Internet, every IP packet goes accross not more than 30 routers before reaching
its destination. But some IP packets have abnormal TTL values which is decreased
by more than 30 hops. We assume that IP packets with strange TTL values in IP
headers as malicious packets and hence it is discarded. These packets are likely to
be generated by special tools. Every computer fix the TTL value when it sends
the packet based upon the operating system and the protocol which sends the
packet. It is possible to estimate the total number of routers between source and
destination using the TTL values. TTL Values of popular operating system were
given below in the Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: TTL values of different operating systems
Operating system Protocol TTL Value
Linux kernel 2.2.14 ICMP 255
Windows Server 2008 ICMP, TCP, UDP 128
Windows 7 ICMP, TCP, UDP 128
Windows XP ICMP, TCP, UDP 128
Free BSD 5 ICMP 64
MACOS 10.5.6 ICMP, TCP, UDP 64
Solaris 2.8 TCP 64
Sun OS 5.7 ICMP ,TCP 255
Tools used to implement TTL value analysis are,
 Cisco packet tracer, for simulating real time network depicting the smart
grid
 Cola soft packet builder, to create a packet with fake TTL value
 Snort, an IDS tool to detect and isolate the packets with fake TTL value
which falls in the range of abnormal TTL value
TTL values of normal and abnormal IP packets based upon the average hop
count is given below:
Normal TTL value: if 30< ttl <= 64 : 98 < ttl <= 128 : 225 < ttl <= 255
Abnormal TTL value: if 1< ttl <= 30 : 64 < ttl <= 98 : 128 < ttl <= 225S
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Cisco Packet tracer is used to simulate a network topology consisting of six
clients connected to two server via three routers and two switch. Each node ping’s
the node present in other network to test the decremented TTL value. Below
Figure 4.7 shows the Network created using Cisco packet tracer to analyse the
TTL values.
Figure 4.7: Network used for TTL value analysis
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Many IP addresses attached to the same MAC would mean that many IP’s coming
through the same interface and hence those packets can be rejected with the help
of table maintaining the list of source with its IP Address and MAC address. In
most of the modern attacks, single attacker create random source flooding attack
and hence it is easy to distinguish the source with fake MAC address. Hping3
tool is used to create Random source flooding attack which creates thousands of
Packets in few minutes. It produces an real time DDOS attack with same MAC
address. But MAC address does not appear in the IP packet once it crosses the
network on which originates. Hence MAC value analysis is useful only when the
fake IP packet raises within the network. ARPwatch tool is used to analyse the
list of newly added IP and MAC pairs in the ARP table. ARPwatch tool produces
an alert when there is an new entry of new IP address and MAC value pairs into
the ARP table which can be verified with the help of Wireshark tool also. Figure
4.8 shows the result of arpwatch tool depicting the occurrence of changed MAC
and IP pair.
Tools used: Hping, ARPWatch, Snort, Wireshark
 Hping tool is used to create an random source flooding attack
 ARPwatch is used to monitor the network for IP and MAC address infor-
mation along with time-stamp
 Ethernet traffic activity like Changing IP and MAC address address is main-
tained in the database and dropped using Snort tool
 Wireshark is used to cross verify the presence of fake IP and MAC entry
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Figure 4.8: MAC value analysis
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented various technique to prevent the Distributed Denial of
Service attack in Smart Grid system. Simulation results has shown that marking
scheme helps to easily differentiate the attack packets compared to the normal
legitimate packets.
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Conclusions and Future work
This thesis deals with detection and isolation of DDOS attack in Smart Grid
systems by using three methods. First method involves detecting fake packets
which are created by the attacker during Distributed Denial of Service attack
by comparing TTL value. But still there are packets which are escaping from
this method since attacker now uses more sophisticated software’s where they can
change the TTL Values also. Hence we need a method which detects the packet
escaped from the first method. So we created second scheme which uses marking
scheme to produce an mark over each IP packet to find and isolate the attack
packets. Each packet travelling across same router have similar kind of marking.
Hence the fake packets which are having an Marking irrespective of its network
can be detected. Marking scheme is useful when the routers among all network
cooperate to find the attack path. There are cases where the DDOS attack were
created within the network targeting another system inside the network. So we
created third scheme which uses MAC value to differentiate fake packets Since two
packets coming from two different users cannot have same MAC value.
In future we can extend the work done to prevent DDOS attack, when the
attacker changes both the MAC and IP address. We can Integrate the TTL value
analysis and Marking scheme together at Router level to detect and prevent DDOS
attack.
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